The Doha Round and Kenya: Good and Not So Good Lessons by Eduardo Zepeda
International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC - IG)
Poverty Practice, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP
Esplanada dos Ministérios, Bloco O, 7º andar
70052-900    Brasilia, DF -  Brazil
The views expressed in this page are the authors’ and not
necessarily those of  the United Nations Development
Programme or the Government of Brazil.
E-mail: ipc@ipc-undp.org    URL: www.ipc-undp.org
Telephone:   +55 61 2105 5000
The International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth is jointly supported
by the Poverty Practice, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP
and the Government of Brazil.
   January, 2010
No. 102
The Doha Round and Kenya:
Good and Not So Good Lessons
by Eduardo Zepeda,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace/UNDP
Change in Exports, Imports,
and Productionby Commodity  (%)*
Sector Exports   Imports          Production
Source: Authors’ computation using the country model.
* Figures represent the percentage change between the annual average figure of the Doha scenario
for each of the variables and the average annual figure of the baseline.
Agriculture 3.0 –2.1 0.7
Processed food 13.0 23.9 2.7
Non-food industries –4.1 1.3 –2.1
Services  –4.1 4.0 0.2
Total  0.2 0.1 0.6
The global financial crisis and spiking unemployment
figures have raised the threat of escalating barriers to trade.
An early conclusion to the Doha Round might help avert some
of the increase in protectionism, but no one knows by how much.
And while Doha will help the world economy, it will also create
winners and losers across countries and across sectors within
countries (Polaski, 2006). How much developing countries can win
or lose depends, to a large extent, on how the issue of agricultural
subsidies in developed countries is resolved. But it also depends on
the definition of sensitive commodities and the effects of further
liberalising trade in manufacturing goods. Developing countries will
have to look very carefully at the gains and losses from proposed
Doha Round agreements, the so-called “modalities”. For many
developing countries, the nature of any agreed package will be
more important than reaching any agreement by a specific deadline.
Consider Kenya, a low human development country with an annual
GDP per capita of about US$700. Kenya vigorously exports agricultural
goods to the European Union (EU) and textiles to the United States,
as well as a few manufacturing goods to neighbouring countries,
but it imports a broad range of manufactured goods. As will be the
case for many other Sub-Saharan economies, Doha is likely to have
significant effects throughout the Kenyan economy and many of
those effects will be closely linked to the terms of the negotiations.
According to Zepeda et al. (2009), the annual output of sectors could
change up to plus or minus 10 per cent.1 Compared to a no-Doha
scenario, the study finds that Kenya’s average annual total production
from the food processing and agriculture sectors would be 2.7 and
0.7 per cent higher, respectively (see table). Changes would result
mainly from rising exports of agricultural goods and processed
foods, as well as from rising imports of processed foods and
declining imports of agricultural goods. Underscoring the importance
of negotiations, the study suggests that the driving force behind
most of these changes is the reduction of agricultural subsidies
in developed countries, particularly the commitment to eliminate
export subsidies by 2013. In the case of rising imports of processed
food, the driving force is the reduction of Kenya’s own tariffs.
The study also shows that Doha’s effect on the manufacturing
and extractive industries will be negative: exports of manufacturing
goods will fall while imports increase, resulting in a –2.1 per cent
drop in annual output. Output will fall in all but one of Kenya’s
non-food industries. The key factor here is the drop in world prices
triggered by the implementation of the Doha agreements and,
in some cases, Kenya’s own tariff reductions.
For Kenya the overall balance is positive. Adding changes
throughout the economy, the liberalisation of trade in goods
under Doha would boost annual GDP by 0.2 per cent. The overall
development impact would also be positive, since employment
might increase, particularly among the unskilled, and poverty is
likely to fall. Overall welfare would increase and consumption would
rise. This is all good news for Kenya, which would probably be a
winner in the Doha Round.
The overall positive balance for Kenya depends critically on how
much developed countries reduce their support for agriculture and
how much protection Kenya can retain for its manufacturing sector.
Like many other developing countries, Kenya cannot afford to
overlook details in the Doha negotiations; their priority should
be to reach a good agreement rather than to meet deadlines.
As Kenya reaps the benefits of Doha, it will increasingly specialise
in agriculture rather than manufacturing. This will enable the country
to make more intensive use of its most abundant resource: low-skilled
rural workers. But the realisation of Kenya’s development aspirations
cannot rest on agriculture alone. Zepeda at al. (2009) posit that World
Trade Organisation (WTO) rules and their implementation should
allow developing countries like Kenya to acquire the necessary
space to develop a competitive, high value-added manufacturing
base. Locking countries like Kenya into the static comparative
advantage economics of the present will not be a sustainable basis
for a future global trade regime that works for developing countries.
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Note:
1. The study uses two dynamic computable general equilibrium models to analyse the effects
that the liberalisation of trade in goods would have on the Kenyan economy under a
likely Doha scenario, based on the state of negotiations as of July 2008.